University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1945

Constitutionality of Praty-Circle Bills
Kenneth Craddock Sears

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenneth Craddock Sears, "Constitutionality of Praty-Circle Bills," 13 University of Chicago Law Review 52
(1945).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTY-CIRCLE BILLS

T

KEMTH C. SEARS*

HE Sixty-fourth General Assembly of Illinois passed the long-

debated party-circle bills applicable in fact only to an amendment
of Section 2 of Article XIV of the Illinois constitution. The vote in
the Senate was 4o to i; in the House, 127 to 3. Attorney-General Barrett
delivered two opinions to Governor Green that these bills were unconstitutional. Despite the fact that the veto message of the Governor, relying in
part upon the Attorney-General's opinion, stated that a "copy of his
opinion is on! file in my office for the inspection of any interested citizen,"
the Attorney-General's office refused to send to the writer a copy of his
opinions. It was claimed that his opinions to the Governor were confidential. At the time this claim, was made, a portion of the opinions had already been printed in the Chicago Tribune., However, a copy of the Attor-ney-.General's opinions was secured through the kindness of John William
Chapman, Secretary to Governor Green. The Attorney-General was notified that his opinions would be reviewed by the writer and that it would be
assumed that the copy of his opinions received from Mr. Chapman was
correct unless the Attorney-General sent a copy from his office. There was
no answer to this letter, and here are the opinions of the Attorney-General:
SENATE BILL 514
64TH GENERAL
To

ASSEMBLY

=rrGOVERNOR:

At your request, I have examined, as to its form and constitutionality, Senate Bill
No. 514 enacted by the Sixty-fourth General Assembly, being an Act entitled,
An Act in relation to resolutions adopted by political parties with reference to proposed
amendments to the Constitution of the State to be submitted prior to January 1, '947.

This is a companion Bill to Senate Bill 516.
This Bill authorizes political parties, prior to January E,1947, to adopt a resolution
either for or against any proposed amendment to the constitution of the State and forward a certified copy thereof to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State is authorized to certify such resolution to the county clerk of each county in the State, and
the county clerk is authorized in the printing of the ballots to have the proposed amendment printed under the political party appellation.
This Bill is a part of the plan to permit a vote in the party circle to be counted as a
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
x Friday, July 27, 1945.
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vote for the proposed constitutional amendment, if the political party has by resolution approved the proposed constitutional amendment at its convention.
In my opinion to you on Senate Bill No. 516, as of this date, I held said Bill to be unconstitutional and void. The reasons therein stated apply with equal force to this Bill,
which I also hold to be in conflict with Article XIV, Section 2 of the Constitution.
I am therefore returning herewith, Senate Bill No. 514 without my approval.

[Siged] GEORGE F. BARRur
Attorney General
SENATE BiLL

No. 516

64TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

To

=n

GOVERNOR:

At your request, I have examined, as to its form and constitutionality, Senate Bill
No. 516 enacted by the Sixty-fourth General Assembly, being an Act entitled,
An Act to amend Sections 6-6 and 17-ix of

An Act concerning election, approved
May 11, 1943, as amended.

This Bill proposes to change the method of voting upon a constitutional amendment
submitted to referendum prior to January 1, 1947. It permits the printing of a proposition on the ballot, either for or against the adoption of a constitutional amendment,
under the party appellation or title and following the names of the candidates of the
political party, in case such political party, at its convention, has adopted a resolution
favoring or opposing the amendment. The Bill provides that a vote in the party circle
shall be counted as a vote for or against the proposed constitutional amendment, as the
case may be, depending upon the resolution of the political party as evidenced by the
positive or negative form of the proposition appearing in the party column.
The method prescribed for amending the Illinois Constitution, other than by a constitutional convention, is set forth in Section 2, Article XIV of the Illinois Constitution
as follows:
Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House of the General Assembly, and if the same shall be voted for by two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the
two houses, such proposed amendments, together with the yeas and nays of each house thereon,
shall be entered in full on their respective journals; and said amendments shall be submitted to
the electors of this State for adoption or rejection, at the next election of members of the General Assembly, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. The proposed amendments shall
be published in full at least three months preceding the election, and if a majority of the electors
voting at said election shall vote for the proposed amendments, they shall become a part of this
Constitution. But the General Assembly.shall have no power to propose amendments to more
than one article of this Constitution at the same session, nor to the same article oftener than
once in four years.
In order to determine the validity of Senate Bill 516, it becomes necessary to ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution as disclosed by the language of
Section 2, Article XIV. This section of the Constitution requires that a proposed
amendment to the Constitution be submitted to the voters for adoption or rejection
"insuch manner as may be prescribed by law." However, this language is followed by
the qualifying proviso that in order for the proposed amendment to become part of our
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basic law a majority of the electors voting at the election must "vote for the proposed
amendment."
The usual and customary manner of voting for or against a proposition is a direct
vote on the proposition itself-a direct expression of affirmation or negation-a signification of "yes" or "no" in reply to the stated proposition. The object of an election is
to obtain and record a correct expression of the will of the-voter. Piercev. The People,
197 111. 432. By means of direct affirmative votes, the people of Illinois have amended
the Constitution of 1870 on seven separate and distinct occasions and propositions.
The question of the constitutionality of Senate Bill 516 resolves itself into the question of whether or not the framers of our Constitution could have contemplated the
substitution of the indirection proposed in Senate Bill 516 for the time honored and
proven custom of direct expression of the will of the voter.
The fundamental and basic rule governing the construction of constitutional provisions, as stated by our Supreme Court in American Breeders' Ass'n v. Fullerlon,325111.
323, is as follows:

.... The rules of constitutional and statutory construction are the same, (Peoplev. Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486) and the object in each case is to arrive at the intention expressed by the language used in view of conditions existing at the time of its use .....
The meaning and intention of the language of Section 2 of Article XIV must, therefore, be determined in the light of the conditions existing at the time of its use.
Our present Constitution was drafted and adopted in 187o. A brief resume of the
Illinois laws governing the manner of voting, commencing with the admission of Illinois
to the Union in 18i8, will aid in ascertaining the intention the Constitutional Convention of 1870 sought to express in Section 2, Article XIV.
Section 28, Article II of the Illinois Constitution of i818 provided as follows: "All
votes shall be given viva voce until altered by the general assembly."
The first general election law of Illinois was enacted by the Second General Assembly in 1821. This enactment (Laws of Illinois, 1821, page 74) provided as follows:
Be itfurtler enacted, That the manner of voting shall be by the elector's approaching the
bar in the election room at any time when the poll of the election is open, and addressing the
judges of the election in his proper person, and with an audible voice, to be heard by the judges
and poll keepers, to mention by name the persons he intends to vote for to fill the different
offices which are to be filled at the said election; and the poll keepers shall enter his name and
vote accordingly, and then he shall withdraw.
In 1829, (Laws of 1829, page 54), the provision of the 1821 Act above quoted was reenacted with an addition thereto, reading as follows:
.... Provided, that a voter may vote by presenting an open ticket to the judges, containing
the names of the persons for whom he votes, and the offices; and the said judges shall read the
same to the voter, and the clerks, with the assent of the voter, set the same down in their books,
as in other cases.
In 1845, the foregoing provisions were superseded (Laws of 1845, page 217) by an
enactment providing as follows:
Electors shall vote, by first announcing their own names to the judges and clerks of the election, and then the names of the persons for whom they wish to vote; and the clerk shall enter
their names and votes accordingly: Provided, That a voter may vote by presenting an open
ticket to the judges, containing the names of the persons for whom he votes, and the offices;
and the said judges shall read the same to the voter, and the clerks, with the assent of the voter,
set the same down in their books, as in other cases.
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It was not until the adoption of the Constitution of 1848 that voting by ballot was
made mandatory. Section 2, Article VI of the Constitution of 1848 provided as follows:
"All votes shall be given by ballot."
This provision was carried into the Constitution of 187o as Section 2, Article VII.
The Laws of z885 (Hurd's Revised Statutes z885, page 535) contained the following
provisions:
The manner of voting shall be by ballot. The ballot shall be printed or written, or partly
printed and partly written, upon plain paper, with the names of each candidate voted for, and
the title of the offices. When the ballot is printed, the same shall be printed upon plain paper,
in plain type, in straight lines, with a blank space below each name, of a width not less than
equal to the width of the line in which the name is printed.
The names of all candidates for which the elector intends to vote shall be written'or printed
upon the same ballot, and the office to which he desires each to be elected shall be designated
upon the ballot.
With the advent of the use of tickets in 1829, the "party ticket" came into being.
However, there were no provisions permitting "party circle" voting and rio official ballots provided at public expense. Each voter made up his own "ticket" or used a printed
one furnished by the political party.
It was not until the enactment of the Illinois Ballot Act in i8gi that official ballots
were furnished at public expense. The Act of i8gi incorporated the secrecy of the Australian Ballot system with provisions which, for the first time in Illinois, recognized
and permitted "party circle" voting.
The foregoing historical resume demonstrates that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of 1870 'party circle' voting was unknown in Illinois. It is obvious that the
framers of the Constitution of 1870 could not have contemplated that the language
used in Section 2 of Article XIV would permit the casting of votes on constitutional
amendments by means of the "party circle" device. At the time Section 2 of Article
XIV was adopted, the only known method of voting upon a proposition was that by
which the voter directly signified his intention upon the precise question through an
affirmative or negative vote upon that question.
It appears clear to me that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution of
1870 that an elector, in voting for or against a constitutional amendment, would be required to signify his intention by directly marking his ballot either for or against the
proposition.
The provisions of Senate Bill Si6 and its companion measure Senate Bill No. 514
constitute a vicious, craftily conceived scheme designed to confuse and ensnare the
electors. These provisions contrive to mislead the voter and to cause him to unwittingly and inadvertently cast a vote he did not intend. These Bills attempt to legalize the
perpetration of this fraud and deception. They also seek to substitute the desires of a
political party for the considered judgment of the voter on the important issue of
changes in our basic law. These Bills strike a foul blow at the freedom and integrity of
the ballot. They embody a stratagem which reeks with the savor of machine politics
and would substitute the dictates of party conclave for the independent appraisement
of the individual elector. The preservation of our constitutional and representative
processes of government demands that the franchise of the ballot be kept free from all
such artifice and legerdemain. An honest ballot is the symbol of true and good republi-
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can government. Deception and trickery in the elective process has been the tool of the
dictatorships.
I have given careful thought, study and consideration to the method of voting which
would be authorized by Senate Bills 514 and 516. It is my opinion that they clearly
conflict with Section 2, Article XIV of the Illinois Constitution and are, therefore, unconstitutional and void.
For the foregoing reasons, I return Senate Bill No. 516 without my approval as to
form or constitutionality.
[Signed] GEORGE F. BARRETT
Attorney General
THE FACTS
For the apparent purpose of demonstrating that Illinois voters prior to
1870 voted upon constitutional propositions directly (knowingly?) and not
indirectly, the Attorney-General purported to make a "brief resume of the
Illinois laws governing the mainer of voting, commencing with the admission of Illinois to the Union in i818," to "aid in ascertaining the intention the Constitutional Convention of 1870 sought to express in Section 2,
'

Article XIV.'2
After quoting the i818 constitutional provision requiring viva voce voting, the Attorney-General quotes part of and states that "the first general
election law of Illinois was enacted by the Second General Assembly in
1821." Not so! See *An Act regulating Elections," approved March i,
i819.3 Failure to quote Section 13 of this act may have been an oversight.
Here it is:
Sect. 13. And it be further enacted, That at all elections hereafter to be held in this
state, the electors shall vote by ballot. They shall bring their votes legibly written or
printed, on a single piece of paper, with the names at full length, and the offices designated for which such votes are given.-Each ballot shall be folded in such a manner as
to conceal from view, the names written thereon, and shall be delivered by the person
offering to vote, to one of the judges of the election, who shall put the same into the
ballot box, unless rejected as hereinafter provided for.

Section 13, just quoted, seems significant. It seems to conflict with the
i818 constitutional provision for viva voce voting. It may mean that the
first Illinois General Assembly overlooked the constitutional provision. It
may mean a dissatisfaction with viva voce voting and an attempt to provide for voting by ballots with at least a measure of secrecy. With ballot
voting in existence, political parties could have printed the ballots, gener2The Attorney-General also stated: "The meaning and intention of the language of Section
of Article XIV must, therefore, be determined in the light of the conditions existing at the
time of its use." The word "use" is curious. The correct word to express the rule is "adoption."
3Ill.
Pub. L. (i8ig) pp. 9o-oo.
2
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ally used, as early as i819, instead of 1829 as asserted by Attorney-General Barrett. Furthermore, it appears to be obvious that under section 13
of the 18i9 law a constitutional proposition could have been written or
printed in the affirmative any place on the ballot, and it would have been
a vote for the proposition unless the voter was careful to read his entire
ballot and then cancel the proposition if he did not agree with it. That is
"indirect" voting, Mr. Barrett. If the Attorney-General saw this 18i9
statute he apparently decided to ignore it and to quote the very different
provision in the 1821 law which better suited his purpose. If viva voce voting was strictly enforced under the 1821 law it would appear to have been
impossible for an elector to vote on a constitutional proposition without
expressing his intention of doing so.
The Attorney-General overlooked, perhaps, another election statute,
that of January 3, 1823.4 It expressly repealed the two preceding acts regulating elections, and it returned to the ballot system of voting set forth in
the 18i9 act. The only material change appears to be with reference to an
elector who voted in a precinct "where he is not entitled to vote for all the
officers to be chosen at such election." Such an elector "shall present to the
judges of the election an open ballot, in order that they may be satisfied
that such elector has confined his vote to the officers for whom he is entitled to vote." 5 This 1823 statute was in opposition to viva voce voting,
and again "indirect" voting on constitutional propositions became possible in Illinois.
Apparently the next election act in Illinois is found in the Revised Code
of Laws for i828-29.6 The first part of section io of this act is almost the
same as the 1821 provision for viva voce voting; but the proviso clause
states that "a voter may vote by presenting an open ticket to the judges"
who are required to "read the same'to the voter." Thus, it is dear that
under the i818 Constitution the General Assembly oscillated beween
ballot voting and viva voce voting, and apparently settled upon a compromise that was essentially viva voce voting if the later statutes were
7
strictly enforced.
Section 15 of the Revised Statutes of 1845 contained the essence of the
previous revision of 1829.8 Then came the Constitution of 1848 which
omitted the i818 provision concerning viva voce voting and provided that
"all votes shall be given by ballot." 9 After setting forth these two facts the
4Ill. Pub. L. (1822-23) pp. 53-68, §§ 3, 14.
s Ibid., § 36 Ill. Rev. C. L. (1829) pp. 54-68, particularly § 1o; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. (1833) pp. 243-57.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1845) C. 37, § i5.
3 Set forth in the Attorney-General's opinion, supra.

9Ill. Const. (1848) art. 6, § 2.
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Attorney-General made a leap to the manner of voting provided by the
Laws of 1885. Why did he ignore what was passed between the Constitutions of 1848 and 1870? Manifestly, this was the most important period if
he really desired to ascertain the meaning of section 2 of Article XIV of the
1870 Constitution "in the light of the conditions existing at the time of its

use [sic]."
If Mr. Barrett had looked at an act in force February 12, 1849, "0 he
would have found that section 15 of the Revised Statutes of 1845, set
forth in his opinion, was repealed, and in lieu of it there was enacted the
following:
Sec. 15. The method of voting shall be by ballot, which ballot shall be folded by the

voter and delivered to one of the judges or board of election, who shall, without unfolding or opening the same in any manner, deposit the said ballot in the said ballot-box;
Provided, that no ballot shall be received or counted unless the same is written or

printed upon white paper, without any marks or figures thereon, intended to distinguish one ballot from another.
Thus it is clear that viva voce voting was at an end and that secrecy was
sought. With a secret ballot in effect, and with political parties long in
existence with the privilege of printing party ballots, there was nothing to
prevent parties from printing on their ballots only the affirmative of a constitutional proposition. If that occurred then the careless, ignorant, or unwary voter using such a ballot uncancelled would vote for the constitutional proposition even though he was unaware of that fact. That is what
our Attorney-General designates as "indirect" voting. It was indulged in
before 1891 and Mr. Barrett's specious distinction between party-ticket
voting and party-circle voting will not fool any reasonably intelligent
individual who cares to read the history of voting in this and other states.
There was no party-circle voting before 1891 because parties with their
party tickets needed no party-circle. For example, a particular group
within the Democratic party in i88o placed the Republican candidates
for Governor and Secretary of State on its party ticket. Therefore, the
Australian ballot law of 1891 was a reform law that more strictly regulated ballots, despite the concession that political parties could have their
party circles."
10 Ill. Pub. L. (1849) p. 74, § 15.
xxIll. Pub. L. (1822-23) p. i8o; Ill. Pub. L. (185x) p. io7; Ill. Pub. L. (i869) p. 96; Sears,
Horse and Buggy Government, Chicago Sunday Times, p. 6M (April 3o , x939); Laughlin, A
Study in Constitutional Rigidity, I., io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (i943); Sears and Laughlin, A
Study in Constitutional Rigidity, I., i1 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 374 (1944); Bogart and Mathews,
Centennial History of Illinois 199.
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The method of voting provided by the law of 1849 appears to have remained effective until the Constitution of 1870 was adopted.12
LAW

A legal opinion that an act of a legislature is unconstitutional is almost
always supported by authority. But Attorney-General Barrett cites only
two cases and these are cited only for general propositions that are acceptable. The cases cited are not pertinent to the solution of the question of
the constitutionality of the party-circle bills. It is hardly possible that
there is any case law in Illinois on this question because Illinois has never
had a party-circle law for voting on constitutional propositions. Thus, the
opinion of the Attorney-General is not supported by a single cited decision.
Of far greater importance, Barrett's opinion is contrary to Ohio and
Nebraska cases which decided that party-circle statutes were constitutional.
Section i, Article XVI of the Ohio Constitution of i85i provided:
Either branch of the General Assembly may propose amendments to this constitution; and, if the same shall be agreed to, by three-fifths of the members elected to each
House, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and
nays, and shall be published in at least one newspaper in each county of the State,
where a newspaper is published, for six months preceding the next election for Senators
and Representatives, at which time the same shall be submitted to the electors, for
their approval or rejection; and if a majority of the electors, voting at such election,
shall adopt such amendments, the same shall become a part of the Constitution. When
more than one amendment shall be submitted at the same time, they shall be so submitted, as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.

In 1902 the Ohio legislature passed a party-circle bill applicable to constitutional amendments. 4 In a test case, the Ohio Supreme Court, without dissent, sustained the constitutionality of this party-circle law.'Y The
problem for decision was set forth in this manner:
The relator sets forth in his petition that, by certain joint resolutions passed by the
general assembly of the state of Ohio, it was agreed to submit to the electors of the
state of Ohio, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, i9o3, certain
propositions to amend the constitution of the state of Ohio, which propositions are described in the petition. It is also alleged that under the act of the general assembly,
passed May 2, 1902, entitled "An act to provide for the manner of submission of con(Gross) c. 37, § i6.
'3 Ohio Stat. (1853) p. 80.
Ohio Acts (1902) p. 352. The significant sections of this law are set forth in Sears and
Laughlin, op. cit. supra, note ii, at 399.
15State ex rel. Sheets v. Laylin, 69 Ohio St. z, 68 N.E. 574 (i9o3).
12I Ill. St. 18z8-x869
'4
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stitutional amendments and other questions to a vote of the people" (95 O.L., 352), the
republican and democratic parties of the state of Ohio, in convention assembled, took
action in favor of'the adoption of certain of such constitutional amendments, and also
against the adoption of certain other constitutional amendments, and certified their
action to the secretary of state in the manner provided for certifying nominations for
state offices; and that the defendant, as secretary of state, pursuant to said act, is preparing, and is about to print such action of said parties, so certified to him, upon the
official ballot for use at the election to be held orf the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, A.D. i9o3, as part of the party ticket of each of said parties; and in
all other respects in the preparation of such ballot and the placing of such constitutional amendments thereon, is complying with the requirements of the said act of May 2,
1902; and the relator alleges that the exercise by the defendant of any of the franchises,
privileges, rights or powers sought to be conferred by said act is in contravention of the
constitution of the state of Ohio, and prays that he be compelled to answer by what
warrant or rights he claims to act in the preparation or arrangement of such ballot in
the form aforesaid, and by what warrant or right he is about to have printed upon such
ballot the action in favor of or against the adoption of such constitutional amendments by the parties aforesaid, and that upon the hearing hereof he be ousted from the
rights, franchises and privileges so claimed. The defendant demurred to the petition on
the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.'6
The solution of the problem did not appear to trouble the court, which
rendered a brief opinion. The significant part of this opinion is quoted. Observe that the Ohio Supreme Court thought that a party-circle vote was an
7
express method of voting on constitutional amendments.
It was not the design or intention of the constitution to put a premium on ignorance
or indifferentism at the same time that it is the duty of every citizen to inform himself
and to vote upon every matter submitted to a vote of the people. Out of the proposition that a constitution adopted by the people can be amended only by a majority of
the people, it naturally follows that of all the people voting at an election when an
amendment to the constitution is submitted, only those should be counted for the
amendment who expressly so vote, and this is the whole scope of article 16, section i,of
the constitution of Ohio.
The act of the general assembly entitled "An act to provide for the manner of submission of constitutional amendments and other questions to a vote of the people,"
passed May 2, 1902 (95 O.L., 352), enables the elector to vote with or against his party,
on each or all of the amendments, or to vote separately upon each and every proposed
amendment, or to not vote at all if he so desires. So far as we have been able.to discover the act is not in any respect in conflict with the constitution, and not irreconcilably in conflict with the joint resolutions adopted by the general assembly submitting
propositions to amend the constitution.
Demurrer to petition sustained and petition dismissed.'8
' 6 Ibid., at 2 and 575.
17Further information concerning Ohio is set forth in Sears and Laughlin, op. cit. supra,
note ii, at 389.

z8State ex rel. Sheets v. Laylin, 69 Ohio St. 1,14, 68 N.E. 574, 575 (19o3).
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Perhaps the idea of the court was more tersely expressed by AttorneyGeneral Sheets who appeared for relator. He said: "The act cannot be
considered as an unreasonable infringement on the right of a voter to express his will untrammeled, for if it were, it would necessarily follow that
the whole Australian method of voting would be an infringement on the
right of suffrage, hence unconstitutional."'9.
Section i of Article XVII of the Nebraska constitution of 1875 provided:2o
Either branch of the legislature may propose amendments to this constitution, and
if the same be agreed to by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays, and published at least once each week in at least one newspaper in each county, where a newspaper is published, for three months immediately preceding the next election of sena-

tors and representatives, at which election the same shall be submitted to the electors
for approval or rejection, and if a majority of the electors voting at such election adopt
such amendments, the same shall become a part of this constitition. When more than
one amendment is submitted at the same election, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately.

By a number of amendments of the existing statute governing elections,
the Nebraska legislature adopted a party-circle law as to constitutional
amendments.2" An amendment adopted in 19o6 with the assistance of this
party-circle law was promptly challenged. But the Nebraska Supreme
Court in a unanimous opinion decided that the amendment was valid.22
The first two points considered by the court are of no importance here,
but the third question was this: "Is there authority of law for counting
for the constitutional amendment the straight party votes of the republican, democratic, and people's independent party?" In answering this
question affirmatively, the court seemed at a loss to understand why any
other answer could be seriously contemplated. The only problem considered was whether there was a violation of the not uncommon provision
that: "When more than one amendment is submitted at the same election
they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately." The court's solution of the problem was this:
The objection that the provisions of our statute above quoted are not such "as to
enable the electors to vote on each amendment.separately," when several amendments
19State ex rel. Sheets v. Laylin, 69 Ohio St. i, 3 (I9O3).
20Neb. Ann. Stat. (Cobbey's, 1911) p. i5. It will be observed that this section of the Nebraska constitution is very similar to the Ohio constitutional provision set forth above.
21 Detailed information is set forth in State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110
N.W. 1x13 (C907), and Sears and Laughlin op. cit. supra, note ii, at 383.
22 State ex rel. Thompson v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, zio N.W. 1113 (19o7)
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are submitted, appears to be without foundation. The voter may vote a straight party
ticket if he desires, but he is not compelled to do so. He may vote a straight party
ticket in general and make such exceptions as he desires either as to the individual candidates or as to any proposed constitutional amendment. The directions for so doing
in the statute appear to be practicable and without uncertainty. It is not the duty of
the court to suggest methods of submitting constitutional amendments to the vote of
the people. The duty of devising and applying such methods is devolved upon the
legislature, and, unless the method adopted by the legislature is manifestly a violation
of the constitution, and unless it clearly appears that the method adopted by the legislature will not make it practicable for the voters to express their judgment as to each
amendment proposed, the courts are not at liberty to disregard the will of the legislature. A similar method of submitting constitutional amendments has been upheld by
the Supreme court of Ohio."
The Ohio and Nebraska cases, as far as is known are the only ones
that are strictly in point on the constitutionality of the party-circle bills
passed by the Illinois General Assembly last June. Both of them are clearly contrary to the conclusion reached by Attorney-General Barrett. He
ignored them, and it would seem that he did this because he could not
satisfactorily differentiate them. Section 2 of Article XIV24 of the Illinois
Constitution is similar to the comparable provisions in the Ohio and Nebraska constitutions already quoted except that: (i) Illinois has no express provision requiring the separate submission of each amendment; (2)
Illinois has a provision limiting the General Assembly to amendments to a
single article at each session; and (3) Illinois, contrary to Ohio and Nebraska, expressly provides that amendments "shall be submitted to the
electors of this State for adoption or rejection .... in such manner as may
be prescribed by law." The party-circle bills were enacted in pursuance of
this power to prescribe the manner of submitting amendments to the
electors. There is no express limitation in section 2 of Article XIV on the
"manner." But Attorney-General Barrett needed an implied limitation
on this grant of power, and he proceeded to find one. He looked at the following sentence in section 2 which provides that amendments shall be23 Ibid.,

at 394-95 and iii8.

24 "Sec. 2.Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House of the General

Assembly, and if the same shall be voted for by two-thirds of all the members elected to each of
the two houses, such proposed amendments, together with the yeas and nays of each house
thereon, shall be entered in full on their respective journals, and said amendments shall be submitted to the electors of this State for adoption or rejection, at the next election of members of
the General Assembly, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. The proposed amendments
shall be published in full at least three months preceding the election, and if a majority of the
electors voting at said election shall vote for the proposed amendments, they shall become a
part of this Constitution. But the General Assembly shall have no power to propose amendments to more than one article of this Constitution at the same session, nor to the same article
iftener than once in four years."

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARTY-CIRCLE BILLS
come a part of the Illinois Constitution "if a majority of the electors voting at said election shall vote for the proposed amendments." This last
sentence was stated by the Attorney-General to be a "qualifying proviso"
upon the previous provision that amendments are to be submitted "in
such manner as may be prescribed by law." But there is no "proviso" in
the sense in which that word is used by legislative draftsmen. The sentence
in section 2 concerning the number of votes required is just one of the
several sentences in this section.
However, suppose that it is admitted that the sentence concerning the
necessary votes is a "qualifying proviso" of the preceding sentence concerning the manner of submission. What of it? We are in a blind alley, unless it is further assumed that the word "vote" means that an elector must
vote according to one of the methods of voting on constitutional propositions that have been prescribed by law in Illinois since the passage of the
Australian Ballot Act in i8gi. The Attorney-General was again equal to
the occasion, and he made the assumption. In order to support his position
he made a tricky misstatement of the historical facts. Here it is: "By
means of direct affirmative votes, the people of Illinois have amended the
Constitution of 1870 on seven separate and distinct occasions and propositions." Here are the facts. Of the seven amendments which have been
adopted, five were adopted before the passage of the 189i act.25 All five
were adopted during the time that the electors could only use unofficial
ballots, prepared in the main by various party organizations. If these organizations favored an amendment and printed only the affirmative of
the issue on their ballots the voters using them voted for the amendment,
regardless of their knowledge and intention, unless they were careful to
scratch the affirmative statement. This is common knowledge and there
is no reason to think that George F. Barrett is ignorant of it. Therein lies
the deception. There is sufficient evidence of this practice of voting for
constitutional propositions by merely using party tickets.F6 This is what
the Attorney-General calls indirect voting, the type of voting, says he,
that is prohibited by section 2 of Article XIV of the Illinois Constitution.
The result of his reasoning would be that the first five amendments to the
Illinois Constitution of 187o are invalid because they were adopted by an
unconstitutional method of voting.
An additional deception is occasioned by treating the adoption of the
last two of the seven Illinois amendments as presenting the same legal
problem as the adoption of the first five. There can be no dispute that the
2S

Laughlin, op. cit. supra, note ii, at I5o.

26 Sears, op. cit. supra, note ii; Bogart and Mathews, op. cit. supra, note ii.
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last two were adopted in 19o4 and i9o8 under the "little" or separate
ballot method of voting.27 There, indeed, the voter was in effect a negative
voter unless he took his little ballot and made a cross [x] in the proper
place on this ballot. Under this method there could be no indirect affirmative votes, but there were many automatic negative votes, including all
voters who could not be bothered with a mere constitutional amendment
and also those who overlooked voting upon the little ballot. But this sort
of indirect voting is constitutional even if it is a public curse.
. After making his inaccurate and deceptive historical statement the Attorney-General stated that the question of the constitutionality of the
party-circle bills "resolves itself into the question of whether or not the
framers of our Constitution could have contemplated the substitution of
the indirection proposed in Senate Bill 516 for the time honored and
proven custom of direct expression of the will of the voter." The answer
given by the Attorney-General follows:
The foregoing historical resume demonstrates that at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of 1870 "party circle" voting was unknown in Illinois. It is obvious that
the framers of the Constitution of 1870 could not have contemplated that the language
used in Section 2 of Article XIV would permit the casting of votes on constitutional
amendments by means of the "party circle" device. At the time Section 2 of Article
XIV was adopted, the only known method of voting upon a proposition was that by
which the voter directly signified his intention upon the precise question through an
affirmative or negative vote upon that question.
It appears clear to me that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution of
i87o that an elector, in voting for or against a constitutional amendment, would be required to signify his intention by directly marking his ballot either for or against the
proposition.
It is submitted that the first two sentences in this answer are deceptive.
Who has said that the party-circle method of voting existed in Illinois in
387o? What has been stated is that at the time the present Illinois Constitution was adopted the method of voting was by unofficial ballots; that
most ballots were prepared by party organizations; that party organizations could and did favor constitutional propositions and could and did
print only the affirmative of the propositions on their ballots, when they
so desired; that this was an effective method of adopting constitutional
propositions by use of unofficial party ballots; that the party-circle bills
are consistent with this historical tradition; and that if the fathers of the
constitution knew, used, and approved of the party-ticket method of voting on constitutional propositions there is no good constitutional reason
why present-day electors cannot use the party-circle method when this
27 Laughlin, op. cit, supra, note ii, at iso.
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method is less drastic and better regulated than the party-ticket method
was in 1870. Nebraska and Ohio used it to get out of a constitutional bog.
Why can't Illinois do the same?
The third sentence in the Attorney-General's answer is utterly false.
Nothing is cited in its support and it is contrary to the common information of those who know the history of voting in Illinois. The fourth and
last sentence is based on the third.
The Attorney-General failed to mention another item concerning voting
in Illinois in 1870. The ballot that was used in voting upon the Illinois Constitution of 1870 is set forth in section io of the schedule of that document.
Here it is:
Section io.
At the said election the ballots shall be in the following form:
NEW CONSTITUTION TICKET

For all the propositions on this ticket which are not cancelled with ink or pencil;
and against all propositions which are so cancelled.
For the New Constitution.
For the sections relating to railroads in the article entitled "Corporations."
For the article entitled "Counties."
For the article entitled "Warehouses."
For a three-fifths vote to remove County Seats.
For the section relating to the Illinois Central Railroad.
For the section relating to Minority Representation.
For the section relating to Municipal Subscriptions to Railroads or Private Corporations.
For the section relating to the Canal.
Each of said tickets shall be counted as a vote cast for each proposition thereon not
cancelled with ink or pencil, and against each proposition so cancelled, and returns
thereof shall be made accordingly by the judges of election.
Observe the obvious fact that this ballot was designed to make it easy
to vote "For the New Constitution" and the eight separately submitted
propositions and not so easy to vote against them. Observe also that if a
voter came to the polls in July, 1870, with the intention of voting "For the
New Constitution" and accordingly proceeded to drop the prescribed ballot in the ballot box without making any marks on his ballot he would
have been counted as voting for the eight additional propositions even
though he had never read or heard about them and even though he had no
intention concerning them. Even if he had come to the polls with the in-

tention of voting against the new constitution or against one or more of
the eight additional propositions he would have voted for these propositions if he had misunderstood the meaning of the ballot and dropped it in
the ballot box without change. Even if he had correctly understood his
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balt but had failed through oversight or other error to cancel the propositions that he did not favor, still he would have voted for them. And yet
our Attorney-General has the effrontery to assert: "At the time Section 2
of Article XIV was adopted, the only known method of voting upon a
proposition was that by which the voter directly signified his intention
upon the precise question through an affirmative or negative vote upon
that question." If George Barrett is not careful, he will be declaring sections io to 12 inclusive of the schedule to be invalid because they conflict
with Article XIV and thus that Illinois is controlled by its 1848 Constitution because the 1870 Constitution is invalid since it was adopted through
an unconstitutional method of voting.
However, there is an Alabama decision which sustains the method of
voting that was used to adopt the Illinois Constitution of 1870.28 At that
time the Alabama constitution provided for the submission of constitutional amendments "at the next general election which shall be held for
representatives ....and, if it shall thereupon appear that a majority of
all the qualified electors of the state, who voted at said election, voted in
favor of the proposed amendments, said amendments shall be valid. ' ' 29
The similarity of these provisions to provisions in the Illinois Constitution
is obvious. The Alabama General Assembly of 1896-97 submitted to the
voters a taxation amendment applicable to the city of Birmingham alone.30
The act submitting the amendment provided that it should be submitted
at the generalelection to be held in August, 1898. It was also provided that
the official ballot to be used at this election should have printed upon it
these words: "For Birmingham Amendment." No other words concerning
this proposition were to appear on the ballot. The act of submission also
provided that the specified words were to be printed "after the names of
candidates for state offices and-before the names of candidates for county
offices." Thus it would appear that the amendment proposition consisting
of three words was printed in the middle of the ballot. That this was an
obscure if not a deceptive place to print the proposition can hardly be
3
doubted. '
The Alabama act of submission prescribed the manner of voting on the
Birmingham amendment:
Any elector desiring to vote for said amendment shall leave said words intact upon
his ballot, and any elector desiring to vote against said amendment shall evidence his
28May & Thomas Hardware Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Birmingham,

123

Ala. 3o6, 26

So. 537 (1898).
29Ala.

Const. (1875) art. 17, § I.
30Ala. Acts (1896-97) p. 1202.
3zCompare the voting upon the Illinois amendments in 1892, 1894, and i896, when they
supra, note ii, at 1S1.
were printed beneath the names of the candidates. Laughlin, op. cit.
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intention to so vote by erasing or striking out said words with pen or pencil. The leaving of said words upon the ballot shall be taken as a favorable vote, and the erasure or
striking out of said words as aforesaid shall be taken as an adverse vote, upon said
amendment.
The Birmingham amendment was adopted, and it would appear that it
would have taken something in the nature of a political revolution to have
prevented its adoption, in view of the drastic method of voting that was
prescribed. But this is the method of voting that was provided for the
adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1870. The only material difference
is that the Illinois election was a special one, even though some judges
were elected at the same time,- while the Alabama election was a general
election. An attack upon the Birmingham amendment was supported by
an able argument.33 It was asserted by counsel that the amendment was
invalid because the prescribed method of voting upon it violated two sections of the Alabama constitution. The main argument was that that part
of the Alabama constitution quoted, supra, required positive, affirmative
action by the electors to manifest an intention to vote in favor of the
amendment, while the statute, on the contrary, required no affirmative
action to manifest an intention to vote infavor of the amendment but
positive, affirmative action to manifest an intention to vote against the
amendment. As a result, it was argued, the Birmingham amendment was
declared to have been adopted even though it was impossible to know
whether a majority of the electors who voted at the election, had the intention to vote for it, or whether they even knew of its existence. Despite
this argument the Alabama Supreme Court in a unanimous decision held
that the Birmingham amendment had been validly adopted. The court
asserted that "every voter is presumed to know what is on any ballot he
deposits as an expression of his will." Armed with this presumption, which
the court appears to have thought of as conclusive, it was not difficult for
the court to conclude that the Alabama voters who failed to erase or strike
out "For Birmingham Amendment" in legal contemplation affirmatively
expressed their favor for the amendment.
The second objection to the validity of the Birmingham amendment
was that the statute violated section i of Article VIII of the Alabama
constitution which guaranteed to every citizen, who possessed the specified qualifications of a voter, the right to vote at every election. More specifically, the argument was that: "The statute takes away from the elector
32 Ill. Const., schedule § 7.
33 May & Thomas Hardware Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Birmingham, 123 Ala. 3o6,
310 (X898).
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his right, recognized by the Constitution to refrain from voting on the
aniendment and at the same time to vote for the State and county offices
to be filled at the election." The court's answer to this argument follows:34
This position takes no account of the consideration that under any possible form of
submitting a proposed amendment to the people every elector who votes for a State or
county office at the election must through the operation of the Constitution itself in
effect vote for or against the amendment. Article XVII, section i provides, as we have
seen, that an amendment must receive "a majority of all the qualified electors of the
State who vote at" the general election to which it is submitted, a majority, not of those
who vote on the amendment, but of those who deposit ballots for any purpose. Hence
it is that if an elector votes for a State or county office, he necessarily votes on the
amendment, for though his ballot contain no reference to the amendment he is counted
against it. So that by the terms of the Constitution itself he is deprived of the right to
refrain from voting on an amendment if he votes for any State or county office; and the
statute cannot be violative of the Constitution for having this same operation and
effect. The most that can be said of the statute in this connection is that under it it is
easier for the elector to vote for the amendment than against it, in that to vote against
it he is put to the physical exertion of drawing a pen or pencil through the words "For
Birmingham amendment," and he may vote for it without doing this; and of this it is
sufficient to say that such regulations have been several times, and we think correctly
held valid.
A New Jersey case3" is also of interest. In the first place it is stated that
New Jersey four times in its history has made use of the Alabama-Illinois
type of ballot on constitutional propositions. In the second place the New
Jersey Supreme Court unanimously rejected an argument that such a ballot was unconstitutional because it did not give the voter an opportunity
to vote on one of three constitutional amendments and to refuse to vote on
the other two or on one of them. As in Illinois, if aNewJerseyvotervoted at
all in the special election he could not avoid voting for or against all three
amendments. Contrary to Attorney-General Barrett's dictum, it was not
necessary that the "voter directly signif Ly] his intention upon the precise
question through an affirmative or negative vote upon that question." If
the New Jersey voter voted directly upon the first amendment and made
no mark to signify his intention as to the other two, nevertheless he would
have cast affirmative votes for the latter two propositions.
In the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, however, the decision
on this latter point is somewhat confused and divided. The judgment of
the Supreme Court was affirmed unanimously, but there was some differ34 1bid., at

324-25.

3s Bott v. Wurtz, Secretary of State, 63 N.J.L. 289, 43 AtI. 744, 881 (i899), affirming 6z
N.J.L. 6l 38 AtI. iogg (1897) and 62 N.J.L. 107, 4o AtI. 740 (x898).
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ence of opinion and the exact division of the court is not made clear. 36
Here is the significant language of the latter court:
The other objection urged by the prosecutors is that the act providing for the submission of the amendments to the people prescribed such a method of voting-that
while every voter was at liberty to vote for any amendment and against the others, or
vice versa, no elector could vote on any amendment unless he voted on all. This, it is
contended, was not submitting the amendments "in such manner and form that the
people might vote for or against each amendment separately and distinctly."
Assuming the effect of the statute to be as alleged, it is not clear that it would antagonize the constitution. There is, indeed, a sense in which, under such a law, the
people could not vote for or against each amendment separately and distinctly-that
is, they would be required to determine how they would vote on any amendment in
conjunction with a determination as to how they would vote on each of the others.
But in another and an important sense they could vote for or against each separately
and distinctly-that is, a determination to vote for or against any one left them entirely free to determine how they would vote on each of the others.
In which of these senses the constitution should be taken is doubtful, and the members of the court are not as one about it; and, under the established rule that courts

will not condemn a statute as unconstitutional unless its repugnancy to the constitution be clear, we would hesitate to adjudge this enactment invalid.
But there is another reason to withhold us from such a judgment. Under the statute
the election proceeded throughout the state without objection on the part of any person, and, so far as appears, every qualified voter who desired to exercise his franchise
has done so in a mode satisfactory to himself, without seeking to vote on some of the
amendments while refraining from voting on the rest. So that no right has been denied;
no will competent to influence the election has been thwarted, and the discrepancy between the statute and the constitution, if there be any, has proved to be of no practical
moment. Under these circumstances we think the same public policy which permitted
the prosecutors to present the supposed public grievances now requires us to declare
that this is not such a grievance, and the theoretical objection has been waived.37
CONCLUSIONS

Even though Attorney-General Barrett's opinion is based upon a false
premise of fact and is contrary to all the known law there is on the subject,
there is nothing that will prevent the Illinois Supreme Court from agreeing with him if the question ever comes before that court. There is nothing
in the law that is less predictable than constitutional law. Notions about

governmental policy, party bias, political ambition, various sorts of selfishness-all of these are potent in the writing of opinions on constitutional law.
One cannot forget George Barrett's obvious political ambitions and his
harmonious relation with the Tribune Tower, the most powerful, persist36 See the discussion of these cases in Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions 185-209 (191o).
37 Bott v. Wurtz, Secretary of State, 63 N.J.L. 289, 301-302, 43 Atl. 744, 748-49 (1899).
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ent, demagogic, and unyielding foe of constitutional reform in Illinois.
This is sufficient to explain why the Attorney-General devoted a paragraph in his opinion to a "stump" speech denouncing the party-circle
bills as a "vicious, craftily conceived scheme" which "strike(s) a foul
blow at the freedom and integrity of the ballot," et cetera. Then he elevated himself to glory by pretending to protect an honest ballot against
machine politics. Quite a blast against a Republican Senate which passed
the bills 4o to i, and a Republican House which passed them 127 to 3
over the intense opposition of Governor Green, who first approved the
bills and requested their introduction in the Senate, and then attempted
to defeat them in the House after the Chicago Tribune condemned them
in an editorial. Also it was quite a blast against many organizations which
supported the party-circle bills, such as the Illinois Agricultural Association, Illinois Educational Association, Illinois School Boards Association,
City Club of Chicago, and the Chicago Bar Association. As against the
endorsement of such associations George Barrett's bombast will be passed
over by most persons as another ridiculous episode in the long struggle
against selfish reactionaries to' secure constitutional reform in Illinois.

